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Abstract 
In recent years, various out-of-band covert channels have 
been proposed that demonstrate the feasibility of leaking 
data out of computers without the need for network 
connectivity. The methods proposed have been based on 
different type of electromagnetic, acoustic, and thermal 
emissions. However, optical channels have largely been 
considered less covert: because they are visible to the human 
eye and hence can be detected, they have received less 
attention from researchers. 
In this paper, we introduce VisiSploit, a new type of optical 
covert channel which, unlike other optical methods, is also 
stealthy. Our method exploits the limitations of human 
visual perception in order to unobtrusively leak data through 
a standard computer LCD display. Our experiments show 
that very low contrast or fast flickering images which are 
invisible to human subjects, can be recovered from photos 
taken by a camera. Consequentially, we show that malicious 
code on a compromised computer can obtain sensitive data 
(e.g., images, encryption keys, passwords), and project it 
onto a computer LCD screen, invisible and unbeknownst to 
users, allowing an attacker to reconstruct the data using a 
photo taken by a nearby (possibly hidden) camera. In order 
to demonstrate the feasibility of this type of attack and 
evaluate the channel’s stealth, we conducted a battery of 
tests with 40 human subjects. We also examined the 
channel's boundaries under various parameters, with 
different types of encoded objects, at several distances, and 
using several kinds of cameras. Our results show that binary 
data can be leaked via our covert channel. Further research 
and discussion may widen the scope of this field beyond its 
current boundaries, yielding novel attack paradigms that 
exploit the subtle mechanisms of human visual perception.  
  
1. Introduction 
Despite a widening array of defensive measures - including 
intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDS/IPS), 
firewalls, antivirus programs and the like - persistent 
attackers continuously find innovative paths to infiltrate 
malicious code into target systems. Even so-called 'air-
gapped' systems can be breached or bypassed by skillful 
combinations of devious malware and attack vectors [1] [2] 
[3] [4] [5]. 
While breaching such systems has been shown feasible in 
recent years, exfiltration of data from systems without 
networking or physical access is still considered a 
challenging task. Electromagnetic radiation of 
communication networks, keyboards, and computers is one 
of the first type of covert channel researched [6] [7] [8] [9]. 
Other types of acoustic [10] [11] and thermal [12] out-of-
band exfiltration channels have also been suggested. A few 
optical methods have been presented as well [13] [14]. 
However, these methods, which rely on their optical 
visibility, presume the absence of people in the environment 
(e.g., after the work day in the evening hours). 
 
In this paper, we propose an optical covert channel, 
codenamed VisiSploit, which relies on the limitations of 
human vision. Technically speaking, visible light represents 
a limited range of electromagnetic radiation (with 
wavelengths between 390 to 700 nm), which is sensed and 
perceived by the human visual system. Intentional leakage 
of sensitive data through the emanation of visible light via a 
standard LCD screen is futile, since by definition it may be 
detected by humans who see the display. Our covert channel 
exploits the limits of human visual perception in order to 
conceal images (encoded with sensitive data), invisible to 
the naked eye, on the computer screen. Such images can be 
acquired by a nearby digital camera and reconstructed 
through digital image processing.  
The contribution of this work is of threefold: 
1. To the best of our knowledge this is the first optical 
covert channel which uses a computer display screen to 
exfiltrate sensitive data over an air-gap. Compared to 
existing optical methods which demand user absence, 
our method is covert, and hence can be used while the 
user is present or working on his/her computer. 
2. We conducted an experiment with 40 human subjects in 
order to evaluate the stealth of our method and 
determine the optimal threshold for image concealment.  
3. We performed an extensive set of experiments with 
different types of graphical objects, cameras, and 
distances to determine the effective distance at which 
the leaked image can be reconstructed and the quality of 
the reconstructed image. 
The rest of the paper is organized as following. In Section 2 
we present related work. Section 3 describes the threat 
model. Section 4 discusses architecture and implementation. 
Section 5 presents tests and evaluation results. Section 6 
provides brief scientific background. Section 7 discusses 
countermeasures, and we conclude and mention future work 
in Section 8. 
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2. Related work 
Exfiltrating information over an air-gap via covert channels 
has been the subject of research over the years. Covert 
channels investigated are either electromagnetic, acoustic, 
thermal, or optical. Kuhn and Anderson [6] discuss 'soft 
tempest' involving hidden data transmission using 
electromagnetic emanation. Funthenna [15] and AirHopper 
[16] are attack patterns aimed at exfiltrating data from air-
gapped networks using generated radio frequency 
emanations. Other electromagnetic and magnetic covert 
channels are discussed in [17] [9] [18] [19]. Hanspach and 
Goetz [20] present a method for near-ultrasonic covert 
networking using speakers and microphones. Fansmitter is 
another method of acoustic data exfiltration from computers 
with no speakers [21]. BitWhisper [22] demonstrates a covert 
communication channel between adjacent air-gapped 
computers by using their heat emissions and built-in thermal 
sensors.   
2.1 Optical methods and shoulder surfing 
In the optical domain, Loughry and Umphress [13] discuss 
the risks of information leakage through optical emanations 
from computer LEDs. They implemented malware that 
manipulates the keyboard LEDs to transfer data to a remote 
camera. A unique infiltration method proposed by Shamir et 
al demonstrated how to establish a covert channel with a 
malware over the air-gap using a blinking laser and standard 
all-in-one-printer [14]. However, these optical methods 
assume that the user is absent from the room, in order to 
avoid detection which may take place when the user is 
present. In 2013, Brasspup [23] demonstrates how to conceal 
secret images in a modified LCD screen. His method 
required officiation of the LCD screen (removing the 
polarization filter) which makes it less feasible in an attack 
model. The concept of shoulder surfing [24] is discussed by 
Lashkari et al [25], and Kumar et al [26]. The classic threat 
of shoulder surfing refers to a malicious insider or visitor (or 
an exploited surveillance camera [27]) obtaining 
confidential data such as a password or PIN, as the legitimate 
user enters the data. With our method, the presence or 
absence of the legitimate user is not required, since the 
malware may covertly project the sensitive information as 
needed, at any time. Table 1 summarizes the different types 
of existing air-gap covert channels, and presents their 
effective distances. 
Table 1. Different type of air gap covert channels and 
distances 
Method Examples Effective 
Distance 
Electromagnetic [6] [7] [9] [15] 
[17] [9] [16]  
~5-10M 
Acoustic [11] [10] [21] ~15M 
Thermal [12] 40cm 
Optical [13] [14] [23] 
Shoulder Surf [25] 
[26] 
Line of sight 
Optical VisiSploit ~1-8M 
  
2.2 Optical Covert-Channel vs. Steganography 
Steganography is the art of concealing data within other data 
(e.g., documents, media streams, or communication 
protocols). Images are the most popular objects used for 
steganography, and image steganography techniques may 
include changing pixel intensities, exploiting characteristics 
of image compression algorithms, using color redundancy, 
and more. A comprehensive overview of image 
steganography is given in [28]. 
Image steganography techniques are not aimed at leaking 
data through an air-gap. In an air-gapped case, the image is 
captured optically as a snapshot by a remote camera, hence 
many of its visual properties are not preserved (e.g., image 
resolution and quality, color intensities, etc.). Consequently, 
since the original image differs from the new one, usually 
encoded message is not recoverable. To the best of our 
knowledge no work has been conducted in the 
steganography field investigating the application of 
steganography in an air-gap scenario. Our work focuses on 
an optical covert channel which can be used to reconstruct 
messages concealed within images taken by an external 
camera, despite the optical limitations. In particular, we 
conduct comprehensive tests with different types of cameras, 
from a number of distances, and at various thresholds. We 
also measured the distance at which the data is recoverable 
and the rate. The differences between traditional image 
steganography and an optical covert channel are presented in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Differences between image steganography and an 
optical covert channel 
 Concealed 
from 
Reconstructed from 
Image 
steganography 
Human eye Original image 
(transferred digitally) 
Optical covert-
channel 
Human eye Image taken from 
remote camera (loss in 
resolution and image 
quality) 
3. Threat model 
The threat model necessitates contaminating the target 
computer with a crafty malicious program. Infecting a 
computer within a secured network can be accomplished, as 
demonstrated in recent years [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] 
[1]. The malicious code gathers sensitive information from 
the user's computer (e.g., password, encryption keys), 
encodes it as a visual object (e.g., QR code), and projects it 
on the computer's display, using visual effects that conceal it 
from human perception. The threat model also requires a 
digital camera which can take single shots or video 
recordings of the compromised computer's display. 
Attackers can then reconstruct the sensitive information by 
applying image processing techniques on the images or 
video obtained.   
 Figure 1. Illustration of the optical covert channel.  
In particular, we identify two main scenarios in which the 
threat model is most relevant. (1) The 'Evil maid' [35] or 
'malicious insider' [36] type of scenario, in which a person 
with a camera can be within the compromised computer’s 
line of sight but not necessarily have direct network access. 
(2) A scenario involving a compromised network which has 
one or more display screens exposed to the public domain, 
within the line of sight of a person with camera (e.g., 
dashboards, kiosk screens, ATM machines, etc.). The covert 
channel is depicted in Figure 1. Sensitive data (encryption 
key) is encoded as a quick response (QR) code and covertly 
concealed on the computer screen. It can be projected on the 
screen either when the user is absent (a) or when the user is 
working on the computer (b). Alternatively, it can be 
concealed on a publicly accessed screen (e.g., dashboard), if 
available (c). A person in close proximity to the computer 
(d), equipped with a camera (e.g., hidden camera) takes a 
photo or video of the computer screen. The concealed data 
is then reconstructed from the photographic or video images 
using image processing techniques (e) (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2.  Sample photo of screen (with concealed QR), 
after basic image processing. 
 
 
Notably, threat models in which the attacker must be in close 
proximity of the emanated device are common in a variety 
of covert channels [13] [25] [16] [9]. 
4. Design and implementation 
In this section we describe the basic concealment methods 
and describe the implementation of our optical covert 
channel. 
4.1 Objects 
During our experiments, we tested three kinds of visual 
objects (Figure 3): an image, a QR code, and plain text. The 
three types of objects reflect different types of data that an 
attacker might want to exfiltrate using the covert channel. 
Images represent pictures, drawings, computer aided design 
(CAD) graphics, and so on. While the original image might 
not be recovered perfectly, the main outline is constructible 
so it remains potentially valuable. We specifically use an 
image of an office building plan (scaled from an original 
1400x906 bitmap). The image outlines 14 offices, three 
meeting rooms, a lobby, a kitchen area, and a bathroom. The 
image also includes detailed information such as the 
locations of 63 workstations, tables, and chairs. QR code, 
another type of visual object, is used during the experiments. 
The QR code [37] represents two-dimensional barcode 
which consists of white and black dots. The amount of data 
depends on: (1) the encoding scheme, (2) the version, and 
(3) the error correction level. The encoding scheme 
determines whether QR stores numeric/alphanumeric 
characters or binary data. The version is the dimension of the 
symbol and is the main factor in QR storage capacity. Based 
on the Reed-Solomon algorithm, QR codes have five levels 
of error correction: level L (in which 7% of the code words 
can be recovered), level M (15%), level Q (25%), and level 
H (30%) [37]; the higher the error correction level, the less 
storage capacity. QR is particularly interesting for 
VisiSploit, since it allows exfiltration of textual and binary 
information which are also error-sensitive. For our 
experiments, we use version 3 QR code (29x29) with error 
correction level M, which can encode 352 bits of data (101 
digit number). We also tested our method with simple plain 
text images of three different sizes. This type of image is 
suitable for leaking short textual data such as passwords or 
identifiers. 
 
Figure 3. The image, QR code, and plain text objects used for 
the evaluation of our covert channel.  
 
    
4.2 Image concealment 
It is known that human vision faces limitations resolving fast 
flickering images and certain color differences and 
wavelengths [38] [39] [40] [41]. For interested readers, we 
present the scientific background on this subject in Section 
6. We use two techniques to conceal images in the 
background: (1) embedding the image on a bright or dark 
background surface ("embedding"), and (2) blinking the 
image at high frequency ("blinking").  
4.2.1 Embedding image on bright/dark surface 
Modern computer monitors are capable of displaying each 
pixel in any one of at least 16,777,216 color variations. 
Usually, the color of each pixel is defined as triples of red, 
green, and blue (RGB) channels. Each channel is encoded 
by eight bits, which represent the intensity of the component 
in the triple. This scheme is referred to as true color or 24-
bit color depth. Figure 4 depicts three samples of embedding 
images on bright and dark surfaces with close RGB. The nine 
circles have an increasing intensity from left to right.  
Obviously, where the brightness value of the object is equal 
to the brightness value of the background (left circle), the 
object becomes invisible. Where the brightness value of the 
object is close to the brightness value of the background 
(right eight circles) it may be visually difficult to notice and 
detect some the objects by the naked eye. 
 
Figure 4. Samples of bright on bright and dark on dark 
surfaces with increasing contrast.  
      
4.2.2 Blinking image 
The refresh rate is the number of times in one second that the 
screen draws the displayed image. Older LCD monitors have 
a refresh rate of 60Hz, while newer monitors have a rate of 
120Hz or more. The number of frames the computer can 
change per second is called frames per seconds (fps), and 
this is a dependent on both the video card and the computer 
screen. 60 fps is the default setting of many desktop 
computers. By only displaying a bitmap in a few frames 
every second, the effect is a fast blinking image which is 
difficult for the human eye to perceive. When the image 
exposure time falls below a given threshold, the human 
visual system will fail to detect the object. We also combined 
the two techniques by using the intensity (previously 
discussed in subsection 4.2.1) and flashing together.  
4.3 Concealment process 
Concealing an image on a  background involves three main 
steps: (1) locating a bright or dark surface to embed the 
image in, (2) histogram compression: reducing the image to 
a binary (two color) image at a specified level of low 
intensity, and (3) embedding the image in the surface.  
For testing, we implemented a VisiSploit prototype for 
Windows OS. Our implementation consists of the image 
concealment module (Figure 5) which is a dynamic-link 
library (DLL) that mediates between the application and its 
Graphics Device Interface (GDI) DLL. The GDI itself 
interacts with device drivers and handles graphical 
operations such as drawing bitmaps and text, filling shapes, 
and more. The image concealment module is capable of 
intercepting and modifying different Windows OS GDI 
functions. In our prototype, we locate bright or dark regions 
and draw the image objects into it. More on GDI regions, 
drawings and clipping can be found in [42]. Note that the 
concealment module must be injected into each process 
separately. System wide implementation would require the 
construction of a kernel level display driver.  
Figure 5. VisiSploit's image concealment module 
 
 
Reduction to two color image. Reduction of the image to a 
two color image involves an intermediate step of transferring 
it to a grayscale image [43]. To create a two color image 
(from a grayscale image), at a specified intensity level, we 
use a cluster based threshold using Otsu's algorithm [44]. 
Note that the contrast levels are represented in this work in 
the form of the ratio between background and image pixels 
calculated using the following formula: 
% = 100(
| − |
255 ) 
Where  and  are the grayscale values of the background 
surface and the image. 
4.4 Reconstruction process 
After taking a photo or video of a monitor, we use image 
processing in order to reconstruct the concealed object. we 
provide a brief description of the reconstruction process 
here, while a more detailed and mathematical explanation is 
provided in Appendix A. This process consists of three steps: 
(1) image desaturation, (2) dynamic range extension, and (3) 
image sharpening. Desaturating the image to transform it 
from sRGB color space (standard RGB) into grayscale color 
space. This step removes background noise and colored 
pixels at unnecessary wavelengths. Extension of the 
dynamic range by around 40-50% is achieved by using 
histogram equalization [45]. This greatly increases the 
contrast and significantly helps in the identification of the 
object and its reconstruction. Final sharpening of the 
contrasted image is achieved using the unsharp masking 
method [46]. Automatic and improved image reconstruction 
might involve computational analysis and advanced 
computer vision methods, however this is left for future 
work.  
5. Tests and evaluation  
The initial phase of evaluation aims to reveal the stealth 
threshold, i.e., the minimal amount of contrast intensity 
between an object and its background needed, whereby 
human subjects can still notice the presence of an object 
while working their computers. We evaluated the threshold 
of visibility by conducting a series of tests with human 
subjects. At the beginning of the tests, subjects were told 
about the existence of a hidden object (image, QR, or text) 
in white and black surfaces. We control the intensity of the 
object and its blinking frequency, while the human subject 
staring right at the computer's display. When the subject 
detects the image on the screen, the tester makes note of the 
threshold's value, and the subject proceeds to the next image. 
Note that the subject is seated at a comfortable distance and 
angle from the display, when he/she knows in advance about 
the existence of an object on the display. In a real covert 
channel scenario, the computer user is not aware of the 
presence of an object or when it is displayed, and he/she does 
not know the object’s position on the display. Consequently, 
we assume that the threshold values obtained by our in-lab 
tests should be more than adequate for a real-life scenario, at 
least in terms of the user’s awareness. 
5.1 Concealment results 
Table 3 presents the testing results of the 40 subjects tested, 
for QR, text, and image tests, each in bright and dark 
configurations. The measurements are given in thresholds, 
which represent the contrast level between the object and its 
white or black background (a lower threshold means lower 
contrast). As noted, we use percentage values instead of 
numerical color values, which is justified, since we are 
interested in the perceived contrast between the intensity of 
the object and its background.  
Table 3 includes the minimal brightness/darkness threshold 
noticed by the subjects. It also includes the average of this 
threshold over the 40 subjects, and the standard deviation. 
The major configurations are ‘Bright’ (bright object on white 
background) and ‘Dark (dark object on black background). 
These configurations are further separated into ‘Static,’ 
‘Blink 60 Hz,’ and ‘Blink 30 Hz.’ The values, in percent, 
refer to the brightness of the object and the background. Each 
subject was requested to indicate the point at which he/she 
could see the object (the minimal delta or contrast). 
As can be seen, the average and minimal thresholds of the 
‘Dark on Dark’ sub-configurations are, in general, 
significantly lower than the respective values of the ‘Bright 
on Bright’ sub-configurations. Effectively, this means that 
embedding images on a white background is a better choice 
for the optical covert channel. We note that prior to the test, 
subjects were informed about the existence of a hidden 
object in the display. We assume that the thresholds are even 
higher in a real-life scenario, when user is not aware of an 
image concealed on the screen. Note that the average values 
of the text object pose an exception. Its thresholds are higher 
than those of the QR and image objects, meaning that the 
hidden text images were not well identified, compared to the 
concealed image and QR objects This phenomena is due to 
the relatively small emission surface (small number of 
pixels) compared to QR and image objects. 
Table 3. The threshold results for 40 subjects tested 
 QR Text Image 
Minimal Average 
of 40 
subjects 
Stdev Minimal Average 
of 40 
subjects 
Stdev Minimal Average 
of 40 
subjects 
Stdev 
Bright Static 2.11% 2.45% 0.39% 3.50% 4.46% 0.49% 1.83% 3.18% 0.93% 
Blink 60 3.68% 5.79% 1.22% 12.00% 16.03% 3.27% 4.26% 6.36% 1.09% 
Blink 30 4.08% 5.61% 0.79% 13.50% 15.88% 1.99% 4.74% 5.98% 0.72% 
Dark Static 0.20% 0.36% 0.19% 2.50% 4.53% 1.57% 0.15% 0.94% 0.70% 
Blink 60 0.20% 0.86% 0.50% 6.00% 13.80% 3.91% 0.68% 1.52% 0.63% 
Blink 30 0.39% 0.92% 0.51% 6.50% 14.23% 3.63% 0.49% 1.58% 0.64% 
 
5.2 Reconstruction results 
Equipped with the thresholds for object concealment, we 
conducted a set of experiments and tried to reconstruct the 
concealed images from photos taken by remote cameras. 
During the experiments we used different camera types, 
several distances, and various data encoding patterns and 
color schemes. Still photographs were used in the static 
image tests, while video recordings were used in the blinking 
image tests.  
The contrast values between the object and the background 
intensities were derived from the results of our earlier 
experiments with human subjects. We used contrast values 
slightly below the minimal contrast values perceived by 
humans. Consequently, we have comfortable (larger) ‘safety 
margins.’ 
The images were manually reconstructed by digital image 
processing tools, until the maximal feasible resolution was 
achieved. We used the open source GIMP tool [47] to 
perform the image desaturation, dynamic range extension, 
and image sharpening. With the video recordings used in the 
blinking image experiment variant, additional preprocessing 
was required: scanning the sequence of frames to find those 
frames that actually capture the object, among the empty 
frames. We focused primarily on three types of objects: 
images (the picture of an office building plan), data encoded 
in QR code, and plain text. 
5.3 Experimental setup 
The LCD displays used throughout the experiments were the 
off-the-shelf 22" Samsung SyncMaster 2243BW and 
S24D590PL 23.6'' which were connected to a desktop 
computers. The display screen settings such as brightness, 
contrast, position, sharpness, and color balance remained at 
their default values. We conducted the experiments during 
the daylight hours in a real workspace, with fair exposure to 
light that simulates a regular office environment. The overall 
settings, including the level of ambient light, the computer’s 
display type, etc. were the same settings used during the 
experiments with human subjects. 
 
5.3.1 Camera types 
During the tests, we used five types of cameras: entry-level 
and professional-level Digital single-lens reflex (DSLR) 
camera (with 35mm and 135mm lenses), an extreme camera, 
a high definition (HD) webcam, a smartphone camera, and a 
wearable camera. Relevant technical specs are provided in 
Table 4. Note that the types of cameras we selected reflect 
different attacks scenarios. The photo or video can be taken 
by a high quality camera (i.e., an insider or visitor), webcam 
connected to a computer infected by a malware, a 
smartphone with a malicious spy application, or by visitor 
with a wearable camera device (such as Google Glass and 
"Spy Watch"). 
 
Table 4. Type of cameras tested  
Type Model Resolution Video 
Still camera 
(entry-level 
DSLR) 
Nikon D7100. 
lens: Nikon18-
140mm F3.5-
5.6 ED VR 
6000x4000  
1920x1080 
(video) 
1280x720 (60 
fps video) 
30-60 
fps 
 
Still camera 
(professional-
level DSLR) 
Canon 5D 
Mark III 
full-frame  
 
 
5760x3840 - 
Still camera 
(extreme) 
GoPro 
Hero4 
4K - WVGA  24-
120/240 
fps 
Webcam 
(HD) 
Microsoft 
LifeCam 
Studio 
1920x1080  
1280x720 
(video) 
15-30 
fps 
Smartphone 
camera 
Samsung 
Galaxy S5  
(I9505) 
4128x3096 
1920x1080 
(video) 
30 fps 
Wearable 
device  
Google Glass 
Explorer 
Edition 
2528x1856 
1280x 720 
(video) 
30 fps 
 
5.4 Tests and results 
During testing we took photographs from a direct angle and 
short ‘shoulder surfing’ range of 50-100cm to a distance of 
8m. Our tests reveal that it is possible to reconstruct visual 
objects secretly displayed on a computer monitor. The best 
results were achieved with a static image on a bright 
background, using data encoded as QR code and a DSLR 
camera. This is particularly useful, since QR code also 
provides a convenient way to encode encryption keys using 
Base64. Table 5 (QR code), Table 6 (text) and Table 7 
(image) summarize the results of static reconstruction at 
different distances using a DSLR camera.  
 
Table 5. Reconstruction rates for white on white and dark on 
dark QR 29x29 with a DLSR camera (35mm and 135mm 
lenses) 
 QR (bright) QR (dark) 
50cm (DSLR - 
35mm) 
95%  95% 
1m  75% 75% 
2m  70% 75% 
3m (DSLR - 135mm) 80% 75% 
4m 75% 70% 
5m 80% 70% 
6m 70% 40% 
7m 75% 30% 
8m 70% 10% 
 
Table 6 Reconstruction rates for white on white and dark on 
dark text with a DLSR camera (35mm and 135mm lenses) 
 Text (bright) Text (dark) 
50cm (DSLR - 
35mm) 
100% 100% 
1m  100% 100% 
2m  50% 80% 
3m (DSLR - 
135mm) 
20% 10% 
 
Table 7. Reconstruction rates for white on white and dark on 
dark image with a DLSR camera (35mm and 135mm lenses) 
 Image (bright) Image (dark) 
50cm (DSLR - 
35mm) 
100% 80% 
1m  60% 60% 
2m  30% 30% 
3m (DSLR - 
135mm) 
10% 70% 
4m 10% 70% 
5m 10% 50% 
 
As can be seen in the white on white case, QR code has the 
highest reconstruction level. We were able to reconstruct 70-
100% of the encoded QR code at a distance range of 50cm 
to 8m. Text was reconstructable at 4m and images at a 
maximum range of 2m. Dark on dark images were 
significantly more difficult to reconstruct, and in this case 
70% of the QR code was reconstructed, when the 
photographs and video was taken from a distance of 4-5m; 
text and images in this scenario were reconstructed at a 
distance of at most 3m. We identify QR as the best candidate 
for reconstruction as it consists of small rectangles of a 
known size, which are well-defined in the 2D space. Text 
and image objects are more difficult to reconstruct, since 
they consist of less well-defined regions and connectors. 
Sample photos taken during testing are shown in Figure 6. 
To the naked eye, the original image reveals no information 
aside from the software parameters displayed in the corner 
(included for ease of record keeping). Following image 
processing, the hidden QR code is reconstructed. The 
parameters were also tested using human subjects looking 
directly at the screen (as opposed to the captured image) so 
as to simulate an unsuspecting user working on the 
computer. 
 
   
 
Figure 6. Sample of photos taken during testing, following 
basic image processing. 
 
5.4.1 Professional DSLR 
To improve the dark on dark results we went on to test 
enhanced equipment and settings, probing for optimal 
results. The camera used was a Canon 5D Mark III, with the 
following lenses: (a) EF 24-70mm f/2.8L II USM; and (b) 
70-200mm F/4 IS USM. We used a tripod to stabilize the 
camera. We tested QR under the dark on dark settings using 
this camera, a scenario in which the entry level DSLR 
showed limited results.  
With the 24-70mm lens, reconstruction was 100% at 
distances of 50cm-200cm. With the 70-200mm lens, 
reconstruction was 80-100% at distances of 3-8m. As can be 
seen, the results with the professional equipment are 
significantly better than those of the basic one. 
5.4.2 Extreme (GoPro), Smartphone, Webcam, and 
Wearable Cameras 
Results shows that the smartphone camera is limited to a 
short distance of at most 1 meter. Limited results for short 
distances were also achieved using the webcam. Table 8 
summarizes the results of reconstructing white on white 
blinking images at 30Hz from a video taken by GoPro, 
DSLR camera (Nikon), smartphone, LifeCam, Google 
Glass. We have used rectangles of three sizes; 100x100 
(small), 200x200 (medium), and 300x300 (large) pixels.  
  
Table 8. Reconstruction rates for white on white blinking 
rectangle with GoPro, DSLR, Webcam, and Wearable 
cameras 
Bright GoPro DSLR - 
35mm 
Smart- 
phone 
LifeCam Google 
Glass 
50cm Small Small Small Small Small 
100cm Small Small Small Small Large 
150cm Small Small Large Small - 
200cm Small Small  - Medium - 
250cm Small Medium  - Large - 
300cm Small Large  -   - 
5.4.3 Wearable camera (Google Glass) 
Google Glass and some types of wearable hidden cameras 
(e.g., "spy pen" [48]) have a low quality-level of a 5MP 
camera. We were able to recover about 30% of a large QR 
code from a distance of 50cm. This distance closely 
simulates an unsuspecting user wearing the device while 
standing in front of the hidden object rendered on monitor 
and captured by the camera. A small portion of the recovered 
QR code is shown in Figure 7. We were also able to identify 
the blinking block from a limited range of 50-100cm. More 
encouraging is the fact that object recovery rates are much 
better on bright backgrounds than dark backgrounds. This is 
beneficial to attackers, since objects on bright backgrounds 
are much easier to hide from the naked eye.  
 
 
Figure 7. QR code reconstructed from a photo taken with 
Google Glass from a distance of 50cm. 
 
5.4.4 Dashboard scenario 
We also tested QR reconstruction under the bright on bright 
settings, from a 40" dashboard display screen (Samsung 
UA40B6000VR) instead of our basic computer display. In 
this test, we used our entry-level DSLR camera (using a 
35mm lens). For QR objects, reconstruction was 70-100% at 
distances of 150-350cm.  
6. Scientific discussion 
In this section we present the scientific background 
regarding human visual perception limitations which 
facilitate the success our optical covert channel. The ability 
of humans to resolve blinking images and brightness 
perception are discussed in [38] [39] [40] [41] [49]. 
Physiological aspects of human color vision are discussed 
further by Gouras [50]. Coren et al also provide a general 
discussion of the human visual system [51], along with 
details regarding the perception of brightness and darkness 
[52], lightness constancy [53], and temporal properties of the 
visual system [54].  
6.1 Brightness and darkness perception 
The level of ambient (environmental) light is known to affect 
visual perception, including the perception of brightness 
[52]. In fact, the human visual system consists of photopic or 
daylight vision, which includes the perception of color, and 
scotopic or twilight vision. In the human retina, two separate 
types of cells (cones and rods) are responsible for daylight 
and twilight vision: cones are associated with photopic 
vision, while rods are associated with scotopic vision. The 
sensitivity of the visual system gradually adapts as one move 
to a darker or brighter environment. Consequently, our 
experiments are performed under a controlled level of 
ambient light. Also, subjects are given some time to adapt to 
the laboratory’s level of ambient light. It is also believed that 
human perception of relative brightness and darkness 
involves two separate systems [52].  
6.2 Blinking image perception 
Concerning the duration of the blinking image, particularly 
with low levels of illumination, increasing the duration can 
increase the likelihood that the stimulus will be detected, a 
phenomenon known as Bloch's law [52]. Concerning 
perception of flickering light, the retinal receptors in the 
human eye can resolve up to several hundred cycles per 
second (cps). However, the sensitivity of neurons in the 
primary visual cortex to flickers is much lower [54]. The 
critical fusion frequency (CFF) is used to measure subjects' 
discrimination between steady and flickering light. This 
measure varies between 10 cps and 60 cps (exposure time 
between 50 ms and 8.3 ms, respectively). The CFF varies 
based on several factors, including the current level of 
light/dark adaptation, the intensity of the light, the distance 
from the fovea, and the wavelength composition of the light. 
Consequently, our experiments are performed under 
controlled values for those factors. In the human retina, 
separate ganglion cells are responsible for sustained (steady) 
light and transient (flickering) light (see also [51]). 
Interestingly, it has been demonstrated [54] that low-contrast 
flashes and equiluminant chromatic (color) flashes activate 
different pathways. In this research, we are particularly 
interested in low-contrast flashes of gray tones. 
7. Countermeasures 
As with other kinds of emanation-based data leakage [9], 
countermeasures can be grossly categorized into procedural 
versus technological countermeasures. 
Procedural countermeasures may include organizational 
practices aimed to restrict the accessibility of sensitive 
computers by placing them in secured spatial zones where 
only highly authorized staff may access them, or by barring 
any sort of cameras (including mobile phones and the like) 
from being carried within the perimeter of the secured zone. 
Such countermeasures, however, are not applicable in the 
case of dashboards, ATMs and similar machines, which are 
usually placed in public locations. In that case, the presence 
of surveillance cameras may have some deterring effect on 
potential shoulder surfers. However, the surveillance camera 
itself may be compromised by a malicious program [27].  
Technological countermeasures may include scanning of 
the sensitive computer for the presence of suspicious 
display-oriented patterns or anomalies at runtime. Practical 
implementation of such countermeasures, however, appears 
to be nontrivial, since the covert channel by itself does not 
perform any explicitly network actions that would normally 
be detected as data leakage. Another possibility is taking 
periodical photos or videos of the computer’s display and 
trying to scan them, searching for obscured visual patterns. 
Again, practical implementation seems nontrivial, unless 
one knows what to look for; in this case, anomaly detection 
techniques may be helpful. Another technological 
countermeasure consists of a thin polarized film which 
covers the display. The user, placed in front of the display, 
gets a clear view, while people around him/her would see a 
darkened display. This technology is commercially available 
[55] [56], for protecting the privacy of computer users. Its 
primary use is protecting portable computers or mobile 
phones from shoulder surfing in public places. However, this 
solution may be more challenging in the case of ATMs and 
similar machines, where the potential attacker can place 
himself in front of the display. 
8. Conclusion and future work 
This work introduces a new type of covert optical channel 
which, unlike existing optical methods (e.g., blinking LEDs 
[13]), can also be used while the user is working on the 
computer. We exploit the boundaries of human vision by 
projecting very close levels of bright and dark images on the 
computer's display. We also take advantage of the limits of 
the perception of flickering objects. As demonstrated in our 
research, using a digital camera combined with digital image 
processing, we were able to reconstruct objects which were 
not perceived by human subjects. The covert channel can be 
produced quite easily, using standard LCD displays and 
digital cameras. We conducted extensive tests with 40 users 
and various types of off-the-shelf cameras to examine the 
limitations of the covert channel. Notably, this kind of covert 
channel is not monitored by existing data leakage prevention 
systems. Future work should include further investigation of 
human vision limitations, particularly concerning complex 
colored backgrounds. Another direction is to use specialized 
optical lenses to extend the effective distance and 
reconstruction quality. Considering the growing popularity 
of wearable cameras and the continuous improvements made 
to the now ubiquitous cameras on mobile phones, the scope, 
effectiveness, and potential for harm of covert optical channels 
such as VisiSploit are expected to increase dramatically in the 
future. We hope that our work will raise interest in optical 
covert channels and promote further academic research in 
this domain.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Figure 8. Outline of the object reconstruction process. 
 
In Figure 8 we present the outline of the object 
reconstruction process, focusing on the main methods used 
at each step. The process starts with desaturation, proceeds 
to histogram equalization, and then continues on to unsharp 
masking. If the result is satisfactory at this phase, the process 
terminates. If the result is not satisfactory, the process turns 
to supplementary methods (user-defined convolutions), 
including emboss, sharpen, and stronger sharpening, as 
needed. The process finally terminates when the result is 
satisfactory or when there is no evident improvement. Note 
that this figure is oversimplified. The various steps and the 
aforementioned methods are further explained in the 
following subsections. 
Desaturation 
The first major step of almost any image processing task is 
removing various types of noise that are entangled with the 
original signal and would hamper its proper reconstruction. 
Different kinds of filters apply to different kinds of noise. 
Subsequently, one should determine the filters that are most 
effective with the given image. Noise-removal filters can be 
applied either in the spatial domain, using convolution 
methods, or in the frequency domain. In our case, the 
original image as produced by the digital camera is a color 
image, but the informative spectrum involves only 
grayscale. Consequently, we apply desaturation [57] [58], 
which removes the so-called chroma-noise.  
Histogram equalization 
In our experiments, the second major step involves 
sharpening the image, i.e., enhancing the contrast between 
the object and its background. Recall that we intentionally 
decreased the contrast to a level at which the object is 
unperceivable by a human subject. As with filtering, this step 
may involve the application of some convolution methods in 
the spatial domain. Histogram equalization [59] was used as 
the first contrast-enhancing tool.   
Desaturation
Histogram equalization
Unsharp masking
Is Satisfactory?
Supplementary methods
(user-defined convolutions)
Emboss
Sharpen
Stronger sharpening
Yes
No
Has evident 
improvement?No
Unsharp masking 
The second contrast-enhancing method we used was unsharp 
masking [60] [46]. Contrary to its name, unsharp masking is 
an image processing method used to sharpen an image. 
Convolution matrix [61] for unsharp masking (with no 
image mask) takes the following form:  
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We applied GIMP’s built-in unsharp masking method. The 
adjustable parameters for that method are the radius, amount, 
and threshold. We used rather high radius values (30-50) and 
amount values (3.5-5.0), and rather low threshold values (0-
10, with 0 being the typical value). 
Supplementary processing 
When the contrast level achieved by the previous methods 
was not satisfactory, we applied supplementary methods, 
using various convolution (or kernel) matrices [61]. GIMP 
allows user-defined convolution matrices. The optional 
convolution matrices used at this step are presented below. 
3 −1 0
−1 1 1
0 1 −3
 
0 −1 0
−1 5 −1
0 −1 0
 
0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 −2 0 0
−1 −2 13 −2 −1
0 0 −2 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0
Emboss Sharpen Stronger Sharpening 
 
The emboss and sharpen convolution matrices, as shown 
above, are conventional, while the stronger sharpening 
convolution matrix was specially crafted and was used when 
the conventional matrix failed. 
